No Magic Carpets

Lessons form the Middle East

As the conventional war in the island of Sri Lanka appears to be nearing its endgame, there are no shortages of obituaries for the Tamileelam struggle. In just three years, Sri Lanka boasts, it has been able to to capture almost all areas administered as the de-facto state of Tamileelam. That’s commendable, but it is no record. Only a couple of years ago, the US led “coalition of the willing” captured an entire, UN recognised, state in less than six weeks. Here, we discuss what winning the war means.

Conventional War

On 01 May 2003, a triumphant US President declared: “Mission accomplished.” A few years later, he went onto recall that photo-op as the worst mistake of his eight-years-long presidency; telling words from modern America’s least popular president, whose reign at the helm was riddled with errors. Hauntingly, in Iraq, victory in the conventional war turned out to be the mother of all own goals, for the invading forces. It paved the way for a costly war of occupation against an invisible enemy.

Should the Colombo regime succeed in defeating the Tamils in conventional warfare, the Sinhala president will hold an even more triumphant press conference, where he also will declare “mission accomplished.” Little thought has so far been given to what happens thereafter; an uncanny resemblance to what became known as the failure to “plan for peace” in the context of the Iraq war. Here, some would argue that Sri Lanka’s “internal issue” does not have an “occupation” dimension.

War of Occupation

While Tamils and Sinhalese may be of similar skin tone and hail from close geographic proximity, all similarities end there. Both the Tamils and Sinhalese have their own unique identities; and, as the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) website recently noted, the two groups have strong nationalisms backed by a long history of confrontations. It was the evoking of this nationalism, by Sinhala leaders in search of votes, that led to the ongoing ethnic conflict in the post-colonial patchwork that was Ceylon.

The Sri Lankan military, which is 99.5 percent Sinhala, will not be seen as anything other than an occupation force by the Tamil people. Indeed, this has been the reality in Tamil towns and cities that have been under the SLA for many years. In Jaffna, for example, almost 40, 000 Sinhala soldiers are keeping around a million Tamils in an “open prison”. Similar situation prevails in Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa, and Amaparai; all towns controlled by the SLA for decades.

Last October, The Economist newspaper reported from Jaffna: “An elderly Tamil man, a lifelong resident of Jaffna, says that on a typical day his car is stopped at numerous checkpoints. “A soldier sticks his gun through the window and barks questions in Sinhala, knowing full well he is Tamil.” Sri Lankan government has banned independent media from Tamileelam for many years. Even what we quote here was from a journalist who was taken on a rare “guided tour” by the military.

Any defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) would be of a similar note to the hasty dismissal of the Iraqi Army by the invading forces. Whereas, a developed entity existed to wage war against, and negotiate with if necessary, removing the visible protagonist would pave the way for the emergence of invisibly scattered groups causing undefinable anarchy. These groups will operate on a similar basis to the insurgent activities in Iraq. That, sadly, means a hell of a lot of bloodletting.

Moderate Tamils

The hope appears to be that the “moderate Tamils” would fill the void in Tamil political spectrum. One recalls the “moderate Iraqis” who were to take responsibility for that country; they were even appointed as “the government”. The fault in this line of thinking is simple: the qualification necessary to become a “moderate” is to agree with the Sri Lankan government, i.e. be opposed to aspirations for an independent Tamileelam. This, severely limits the appeal of the moderates.

Given that the ordinary masses want self-governance and alien armed forces out of their historical homeland, “moderate Tamils”, who only gained that tag by accepting the occupiers, are seen as an extension of the foreigners. Back in 1987, Sri Lanka and India, as is now, tried to install a “moderate Tamil” led administration in the Tamil Homeland. That effort failed to to win any public backing, and disintegrated, because the people saw it for what it was: a puppet of the occupiers.

Any unconventional insurgency is likely to take the form of the one that existed during the previous “moderate Tamil” rule. The Diaspora, most of whom have suffered directly at the hands of the Sinhala state are said to be funding the LTTE out of a longing for justice. That quest is unlikely to disappear at the end of conventional warfare. Diaspora funds will continue to follow to any self-governance efforts in Tamileelam. The transit point for these activities will once again be Tamil Nadu.

Tamil Nadu Factor

Sri Lanka is confident that it would be able to deal decisively against any low scale insurgency, because it has proven experience from two earlier Sinhala working class “revolutions”. Then, the answer was simply massacres of all youths from the villages. A point to note is that the same strategy failed with Tamil militants in the early days because of the presence of Tamil Nadu. As insurgents flow between Iraq and Iran, Tamil militants hit and run from Tamil Nadu.

If insurgency is led by small, little known cells of militants, Sri Lanka and India will be unable to play their Rajiv trump card. Given the vast border territory, anything short of a half a million strong military will be unable to contain the uprising. Some would argue that end of war would allow the economy to sustain such a large military. However, a shadowy insurgency without anyone who could be held accountable is more likely to liberally hit civilian targets, further suppressing the economy.

Old Scores, New Sores

In all likelihood, an end of conventional warfare would lead to an Iraqi style anarchy in the south of India. World powers encouraging instability in this region is understandable. Why India would want such a scenario remains baffling. Perhaps, the only reason is that Indian national interest has had to take the sideline while individuals in the Congress led administration bid to fulfil their ever expanding egos by settling “old scores”. Individuals in the Bush administration also wanted to settle “old scores”.